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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil and gas law from August 1, 2019 to July 31, 2020.   
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
There has not been any significant Legislative or Regulatory 
Developments affecting Kansas Oil and Gas Law from August 1, 2019, to 
July 31, 2020.   
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
1. Jason Oil Company, LLC v. Littler, et al.
1
 
This was a quiet title action involving the mineral interests in two tracts 
of land that were conveyed by two separate deeds in which the Grantor 
excepted the mineral interests for a “period of 20 years or as long 
thereafter” as minerals may be produced.  The Supreme Court determined 
that the common-law rule against perpetuities, being a rule founded on 
public policy, should not be applicable here.  This was a case of first 
impression for the Kansas Supreme Court.    
a) Facts and Procedural History 
On December 30, 1967, Frank E. Littler (Grantor) executed two deeds 
conveying two tracts of land situated in the same section in Rush County, 
Kansas.  Both deeds contained the following language: 
“EXCEPT AND SUBJECT TO:  Grantor saves and excepts all 
oil, gas and other minerals in and under or that may be produced 
from said land for a period of 20 years or as long thereafter as oil 
and/or gas and/or other minerals may be produced therefrom and 
thereunder.”  (the reservation)
2
 
In 2016, Jason Oil Company, LLC (“Jason Oil”) filed a petition to quiet 
title to both tracts claiming to hold valid oil and gas leases.  The petition 
alleged that the successors to the Grantees in both deeds owned all of the 
minerals in and under each tract.  The heirs of the Grantor answered, 
claiming an interest in the mineral rights, arguing that after the deeds were 
                                                                                                             
 1. Jason Oil Co. v. Littler., 446 P.3d 1058 (Kan. 2019).     
 2. Id. at 1059.   
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executed and delivered, Grantor was vested with a fee simple determinable 
in the mineral rights and the Grantees to said deeds held springing 
executory interests in the minerals which were subject to and invalidated by 
the Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule).
3
    
Grantees’ heirs also answered.  They admitted all of the allegations in 
Jason Oil’s petition and cross-claimed against Grantor’s heirs alleging that 
Grantees’ heirs owned the minerals.  Grantees alternatively asserted that if 
the Court determined the future interest in minerals conveyed by Grantor 
violated the Rule, the interests should be reformed under the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) specifically under K.S.A. 59-
3405(b) to conform with the intent of the parties and avoid violating the 
Rule.
4
  
The district court denied summary judgment to the Grantor’s heirs and 
granted summary judgment to the Grantees’ heirs.  The court noted that 
there is no dispute that Grantor conveyed all of his interest in the subject 
properties to the Grantees, subject only to the express reservation, excepting 
and saving a term mineral interest.  The court found that when construing 
deeds, all other rules are subordinate to the intention of the Grantor and 
Grantor’s intention in this case “could not be clearer than stated.”
5
  The 
court also found that Grantor’s reservation had not restricted alienation of 
the surface and mineral estates of the real property in question.
6
  The 
Supreme Court granted the Grantor’s heirs’ motion to transfer the appeal 
from the Court of Appeals. 
From the expiration of the 20-year term, December 30, 1987, to the date 
the district court filed its memorandum decision granting summary 
judgment to the Grantees’ heirs, May 31, 2017, there was no drilling 
operation conducted on either tract and no oil or gas or other minerals were 
ever produced from either tract.
7
 
b) Analysis 
The Supreme Court was asked to decide a question of first impression in 
Kansas that carries the potential of voiding innumerable transfers of mineral 
interests and creating marketable title problems:  Does the common practice 
of reserving a term mineral interest in minerals that continues so long as 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id at 1060.   
 4. Id.   
 5. Id.   
 6. Id.    
 7. Id.   
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minerals are produced create a springing executory interest that must be 
invalidated by the Rule?
8
 
The Supreme Court exercised unlimited review in making its decision.  
With regards to the Rule, the Supreme Court agreed that the district court 
was correct in holding that the Rule did not apply to Grantor’s excepted 
interest, but for a different reason.  The interest was not a reversion, but 
rather it was a present, vested interest to which the Rule is simply 
inapplicable.
9
  The future interest created by the deeds that the district court 
should have focused on is the interest in the minerals that passed to the 
Grantees.  That interest is the right for Grantees to have full possession and 
use of the mineral interest following the expiration of the Grantor’s 
reserved defeasible term interest.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that a 
future interest would violate the Rule; but their task was to determine 
whether the Rule should be applied to this type of future interest.
10
   
The Court noted that no Kansas case has addressed whether to apply the 
Rule to a grantee’s future interest in minerals following the grantor’s 
reservation of a defeasible term mineral interest.  Using the straightforward 
language in the deeds at issue, the Court determined that the deeds created 
in the Grantees a springing executory interest.
11
  The Court went on to 
explain that if the Grantees’ heirs are to receive what the original parties to 
the deed obviously intended the Grantees to have, it will be because this 
Court carves out a narrow exception to the common-law rule against 
perpetuities in Kansas, making the Rule inapplicable to a reserved (or 
excepted) defeasible term mineral interest of the kind presented here.
12
 
The Court agreed with the Grantees that the application of the Rule in 
this case would actually impede the alienability of the land because it would 
result in the Grantor’s heirs holding the mineral interests in the real estate in 
perpetuity.
13
  The Court agreed with other courts that have pointed out that 
applying the Rule to prevent the reuniting of split mineral interests would 
frustrate the policies behind the Rule.  Here, applying the Rule would 
increase the number of owners of the interest over time when the deed 
provision actually provides for the reunification of the surface and mineral 
interest.
14
      
                                                                                                             
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 1063.   
 10. Id. at 1063.   
 11. Id. at 1064. 
 12. Id. at 1065.  
 13. Id. at 1066.   
 14. Id. at 1067.  
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c) Conclusion 
The Supreme Court in this case held that the policies behind the Rule 
include promoting the alienability of property.  Applying the Rule in this 
case would be counterproductive to the purpose behind the Rule and would 
create chaos.  The Court held that 1) the mineral interest reserved by the 
Grantor was a defeasible term mineral interest; 2) that such interest is a 
present interest rather than a future interest, and therefore the rule against 
perpetuities did not apply; and 3) that Grantees’ future interest was a 
springing executory interest.  Finally, the Supreme Court here held that 
where a grantor creates a defeasible term-plus-production mineral interest 
by exception, leaving a future interest in an ascertainable grantee, the future 
interest in minerals is not subject to the Rule.  The Court held that the Rule 
does not apply in this case, affirming the district court’s granting of 
summary judgment to the Grantees’ heirs and ordering quiet title to the two 
tracts.   
2. Northern Natural Gas Company v. OneOK Field Services Company, 
LLC, et al.
15
 
In this case, a natural gas public utility sued gas buyers who had been 
wrongfully converting gas that had migrated from the utility’s underground 
injected-gas storage field.  The Supreme Court reversed the judgement of 
the district court granting summary judgment against Northern Natural Gas 
Company (“Northern”), holding that certification from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) permitting Northern to expand the 
authorized boundaries of its underground storage field to encompass nearby 
wells changed the right-to-produce analysis for gas taken before June 2, 
2010.   
a) Facts and Procedural History 
Northern Natural Gas Company injects into underground storage 
reservoirs large quantities of previously produced natural gas acquired from 
distant locations so it can remove, transport, and resell that gas later during 
peak market conditions.
16
  In this case, some of its storage gas migrated 
beneath the earth to nearby wells in areas Northern did not control through 
eminent domain or contract.  The wells’ operators extracted that gas and 
sold it. A legal struggle ensued over the disputed right to produce 
Northern’s migrated storage gas. 
                                                                                                             
 15. Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. OneOK Field Services Co., 448 P.3d 383 (Kan. 2019).     
 16. Id. at 386.  
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In a previous appeal, the Supreme Court applied the common-law rule of 
capture to rule that the operators lawfully produced and sold Northern’s 
storage gas taken before June 2, 2010, the date when Northern received its 
certificate from FERC.
17
  At issue in this appeal was whether the producers 
could take Northern’s migrated storage gas from wells located within the 
newly certified boundaries from the storage field after June 2, 2010.  The 
district court ruled on summary judgment that the producers had that right 
under the common-law rule of capture.
18
  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding that once the new boundaries were certified, Northern’s identifiable 
storage gas within that designated area was no longer subject to the rule of 
capture.
19
 
b) Analysis 
There were no material facts in dispute as to the issue on appeal, so the 
Supreme Court exercised de novo review as to the legal effect of 
undisputed facts.  The legal question here is how the common-law rule of 
capture operates during the time between certificate issuance and storage 
rights acquisition.
20
 
The Court relied on Union Gas System, Inc. v. Carnahan, 245 Kan. 80 
(Kan. 1989), which is part of the body of Kansas capture-law in the unique 
context of migrated storage gas.
21
  This case held the gap-filling rule 
permitting others to capture and keep an injector’s gas, as developed in case 
law, does not apply after a natural gas public utility obtains certificated 
authority to use a storage area and its gas within that area is identifiable.
22
  
The Court held that the Union Gas exception to the common-law capture 
rule should continue.     
c) Conclusion 
The Supreme Court in this case held that 1) landowners and producers 
did not retain right to capture utility’s gas after date of FERC certificate; 
and 2) cessation of right to capture the gas was not a taking.  The Court 
reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
holding that the court erred when it granted judgment against Northern.   
  
                                                                                                             
 17. Id.   
 18. Id. at 388.   
 19. Id.   
 20. Id. at 396.   
 21. Id. at 400.   
 22. Id.   
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B. Appellate Activity 
1. Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Com’n
23
 
In Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Com’n, the Court of Appeals of 
Kansas addressed, in part, whether the Kansas Corporation Commission 
(the “Commission”) improperly applied the Kansas Unitization Act in 
denying an application by the Lario Oil & Gas Company (“Lario”) to 
unitize several oil and gas leases on the same set of geological formations 
for the purpose of operating them as a single unit when the Commission’s 
decision was based on the ground that the formations did not constitute a 
single pressure system.
24
 
a) Facts and Proceedings 
Lario applied for unitization and unit operations for the Feiertag Unit “to 
enhance the ultimate recovery of liquid hydrocarbons” from several wells it 
owns and operates the working interest in within Shawnee, Lansing, Kansas 
City, Marmaton, Cherokee, Morrow, Basel Penn, and Mississippian 
formations in said unit within Scott County.
25
 
Lario sought to operate a reservoir described as “the interval between the 
top of the unitized substances in the Topeka Formation at 3,570 feet 
through the Oread, Lansing-Kansas City Marmaton, Millrich, Morrow and 
St. Louis formations at 4,700 feet.”
26
 Lario argued said unitization was 
“economically feasible and reasonably necessary to prevent waste within 
the reservoir and thereby increasing substantially the ultimate recovery of 
oil and gas,”  estimating the value of additional recovery of oil and gas 
substantially exceeded the estimated additional costs of conducting the 
unitized operations.
27
  Lario noted that 92.64 percent of the working interest 
holders and 95.53 percent of the royalty owners had approved said 
unitization.
28
 
Cholla Production, LLC (“Cholla”) is one interest holder who did not 
approve of the unitization, who filed a protest to Lario’s application, and 
asked to intervene.
29
 Cholla, being an oil and gas exploration company who 
owned and operated oil and gas producing properties both within and next 
                                                                                                             
 23. Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Com’n, 450 P.3d 353 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). 
 24. Id. at 356.  
 25. Id. at 357. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
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to Lario’s proposed unit boundary, alleged that Lario’s proposed plan 
would cut through Cholla’s contiguous producing acreage and would take 
over two of Cholla’s wells.
30
 It further alleged that Lario’s proposed plan 
did not meet the requirements of K.S.A. 55-1304 because: (1) the plan was 
flawed geologically; (2) the allocations to property owners were unfair and 
unequitable; (3) the plan would substantially and irreparably harm Cholla’s 
correlative rights; (4) the plan would cause waste in violation of K.S.A. 55-
601; and (5) the plan would unduly violate Cholla’s property rights contrary 
to the Kansas and United States Constitution.
31
 
Lario did not object to Cholla’s intervention, but denied its allegations. 
The Commission allowed Cholla to intervene.
32
 
In its order denying Lario’s application to unitize, the Commission 
stressed three points: (1) it could approve Lario’s request for unitization 
only upon a showing that the unit constituted a single-pressure system and 
the unit would contribute to the prevention of waste and the protection of 
correlative rights; (2) Lario had not met its burden to show that its proposed 
unit constituted a single-pressure system, largely due to the varied bottom-
hole pressures shown across the wells; and (3) that Lario’s apparent 
suggestion that it could artificially cure “the problem” by trying to perforate 
all the formations to create a single-pressure system would constitute waste 
in violation of the Kansas Unitization Act.
33
 
Lario sought judicial review of the Commission’s denial of its 
application. The district court, 25th Judicial District, affirmed the 
Commission’s denial of Lario’s application for unitization. Lario appealed 
the district court’s decision to the Court of Appeals Kansas, in part, on the 
ground that the Commission misinterpreted the Kansas Unitization Act by 
using a too narrow definition of the term “pool,” which improperly 
increased what it had to prove in order to show that the leases can be 
operated as a common unit.
34
 
 For the purposes of this update, we will only be reporting on the first 
ground stated above.  
  
                                                                                                             
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 357. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 360. 
 34. Id. at 356. 
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b) Rules of Law 
The Kansas Unitization Act, K.S.A. 55-1301 et seq., gives the Kansas 
Corporation Commission the jurisdiction to regulate and permit the 
grouping of oil and gas leases into a single unit production unit.
35
 
The legislative purpose of the Kansas Unitization Act is to prevent 
waste, to further the conservation of oil and gas, and to protect the 
correlative rights of persons entitled to share in the production of oil and 
gas.
36
 
There are four factors which the Commission must consider before it can 
order unit operations. Under K.S.A. 55-1304, the Commission must look at 
production, feasibility, costs and fairness to all:  
(a)(1) The primary production from a pool or part thereof sought 
to be unitized has reached a low economic level and, without 
introduction of artificial energy, abandonment of oil or gas wells 
is imminent; or (2) the unitized management, operation, and 
further development of the pool or the part thereof sought to be 
unitized is economically feasible and reasonably necessary to 
prevent waste within the reservoir and thereby increase 
substantially the ultimate recovery of oil or gas;  
(b) the value of the estimated additional recovery of oil and gas 
substantially exceeds the estimated additional cost incident to 
conducting such operations; and  
(c) the proposed operation is fair and equitable to all interest 
owners.
37
 
“Waste” is defined under K.S.A.55-1302(d) as being “both economic 
and physical waste resulting from the development and operation separately 
of tracts that can best be operated as a unit.”
38
 
A “pool” is defined under K.S.A. 55-1302(b) as being “an underground 
accumulation of oil and gas in one or more natural reservoirs in 
communication so as to constitute a single pressure system so that 
production from one part of the pool affects the pressure throughout its 
extent.”
39
 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 356. 
 38. Id. at 357 (quoting in part, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-1302(d) (2020)).  
 39. Id. (quoting in part, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-1302(b) (2020)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
130 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 6 
  
 
c) Discussion 
Lario raised the following notable issues on appeal:  
(1) that the Commission misinterpreted the Kansas Unitization Act by 
requiring a “full” or “total”, or even a particular degree or extent of pressure 
communication;  
(2) that the Commission erroneously conflated the two distinct pathways 
to unitization under the Kansas Unitization Act by not recognizing a 
different standard for pressure communication for pools that are near the 
end of their economic life under K.S.A. 55-1304(a)(1) than the standard for 
pools that are not near the end of their economic life under K.S.A. 55-
1304(a)(2). and that the Commission’s order erroneously conflated these 
two distinct pathways to unitization and rendered entire portions of the 
Kansas Unitization Act meaningless.
40
 
(1) The Commission did not misinterpret the Kansas Unitization Act to 
require “full” or “total” pressure communication 
Lario argued that K.S.A. 55-1302(b) does not require “full” or “total”, or 
even a particular degree or extent of pressure communication, and that 
Lario had provided sufficient evidence of pressure communication 
throughout the extent of the proposed unit.
41
 Lario alleged the use of such a 
restrictive test creates physical and economic waste rather than preventing 
it, and would have a chilling effect on future applications for unitization 
thereby causing more waste.
42
 
The Court of Appeals did not find Lario’s argument to be supported by 
the record, noting the Commission did not use the terms “full” or “total” in 
their order, and that the Commission simply required Lario to show that its 
proposed unit constituted a single-pressure system.
43
  
(2) The Commission did not erroneously conflate the two distinct 
pathways to unitization 
Lario argued that the Commission erroneously conflated the two distinct 
pathways to unitization under the Kansas Unitization Act by not 
recognizing a different standard for pressure communication for pools that 
are near the end of their economic life under K.S.A. 55-1304(a)(1) than the 
standard for pools that are not near the end of their economic life under 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. at 363. 
 41. Id. at 361. 
 42. Id. at 361-362. 
 43. Id. at 362. 
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K.S.A. 55-1304(a)(2), thereby rendering entire portions of the Kansas 
Unitization Act meaningless.
44
 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that Lario’s argument 
was “a distinction without a difference”, and stated that nothing in the law 
requires a different standard to be applied for the two pathways to 
unitization.
45
 All units, regardless of their economic condition, must be 
single-pressure systems according to K.S.A. 55-1302(b).
46
  
d) Conclusion  
The Court of Appeals held the Commission properly interpreted and 
applied the Kansas Unitization Act in denying Lario’s application, and the 
district court did not err in affirming the Commission’s ruling. The 
judgment of the district court was affirmed.
47
  
C. Trial Activity 
No relevant trial activity was reported during the survey period. 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 363. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 368. 
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